“If I die before you”: the Court of Cassation once again draws the line between a lawful gift and a prohibited inheritance agreement

patti successori

The prohibition on inheritance agreements

Article 458 of the Civil Code declares null and void any agreement by which a person disposes of their estate or of rights that may arise from a succession that has not yet opened.

The prohibition covers three types of agreement:

  • constitutive agreements, whereby a person contractually disposes of their own inheritance;
  • dispositive agreements, whereby rights to another person’s inheritance are transferred in advance;
  • renunciation agreements, whereby one renounces such rights in advance.

The rationale behind the prohibition

According to the Court of Cassation, the freedom to dispose of one’s own assets until death is a matter of public policy. Why protect it so rigorously? Legal scholarship has, over time, offered three answers:

  • freedom of the testator: whoever disposes of their own estate must be able to change their mind right up to the last moment, and only a will – which is always revocable – guarantees this freedom.
  • the risk of ‘votum captandae mortis’: the agreement would give rise, in those who benefit from it, to a desire for the death of others.
  • unity of succession: the prohibition would mark the end of a system designed to prevent the fragmentation of the succession process into multiple stages, which would risk undermining the mechanisms for asset rebalancing – such as reduction and collation – intended to protect the compulsory heirs, on the one hand, and the co-heirs, on the other.

One could debate at length whether these reasons are sufficient to justify such a broad prohibition and whether the protection underpinning Article 458 of the Civil Code still meets a genuine need for public policy today.

What is certain is that the scope of the prohibition has not remained immune to gradual relaxations, both at the legislative and case-law levels.

The legislature intervened with Law No. 55/2006, introducing the family agreement, an express derogation from Article 458 of the Civil Code designed to facilitate the generational transfer of businesses.

Case law, for its part, has recognised the legitimacy of alternative instruments to the succession agreement which, in certain circumstances, allow for similar effects to be achieved.

Among these is the ‘si praemoriar’ clause.

The ‘si praemoriar’ clause

In Order No. 26306 of 6 October 2026, the Court of Cassation revisited a fundamental distinction in matters of succession: that between a ‘negotius mortis causa’ (transaction in the event of death), prohibited by Article 458 of the Civil Code, and a ‘negotius post mortem’ (transaction after death), which is lawful in itself.

The difference lies in the role that death plays in the structure of the transaction.

A transaction mortis causa is intended to regulate the property or non-property relations of the individual for the period following and contingent upon their death. It produces no effect, not even a preliminary one, prior to that event: the allocation concerns the assets as they will be found in the testator’s estate at the time of death, and the beneficiary will acquire the right only if it exists at that moment.

A post-mortem transaction, on the other hand, governs an already existing situation, making the production of its definitive effects contingent upon the death of one of the parties. The transfer is already in effect in terms of its financial substance.

It is within this second category that the ‘si praemoriar’ gift (‘if I die before you’) falls.

Why is it valid, unlike a donation mortis causa?

Because the donor’s death does not constitute the cause of the transfer, but merely an event to which the parties make the consolidation of its definitive effects contingent.

The contract does not remain without effect until death: from the moment it is concluded, the donee acquires a legally protected expectation, pursuant to Article 1356 of the Civil Code, of acquiring the right.

In other words, one does not dispose today of what one will possess tomorrow as a result of death: one disposes today of a right, the definitive acquisition of which is merely contingent upon the occurrence of a future and uncertain event.

Some examples to clarify

✅ Accepted. X donates his shareholding in company Y to Y, provided he dies before Y. Specific subject-matter, irrevocable gift: death is merely a condition.

✅ Permitted. Tizio transfers his shareholding in Company Y to one of his children, Caio, on a deferred payment basis, and in his will provides that Caio is to forfeit only the claim for the purchase price of the shares. The transfer is immediate: no deed mortis causa.

❌ Prohibited. Mr Tizio and Mrs Caia enter into an agreement whereby, in the event of their death, 50 per cent of the profits arising from the business carried on by Mr Tizio would pass to their respective children in equal shares of 50 per cent, it also being stipulated that the agreement may not be amended without the consent of both parties. This restriction limits the freedom to revoke provisions relating to succession (ius poenitendi).

❌ Prohibited. Caia and her daughter Sempronia reach a settlement regarding the father’s estate, and Sempronia waives her right to contest the allocation of her father’s assets by her mother to her brother. This constitutes a waiver of rights in respect of an estate that has not yet been opened.

Caution: the line is a fine one

Even a seemingly innocuous formulation can alter the nature of the agreement.

Private autonomy offers various options for planning the intergenerational transfer of assets. The key is to identify, on a case-by-case basis, the instruments that enable this objective to be achieved whilst complying with the prohibition on inheritance agreements.